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Recent Developments 
Brown v. Dermer 
Lead Paint Plaintiffs Need Only Show Landlord Had Reason to Know of Chipping 
Paint 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a plaintiff 
in a lead paint action survives 
summary judgment by merely alleging 
that a landlord has knowledge of 
flaking, chipping, or otherwise loose 
paint. Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 
344, 744 A.2d 47 (2000). It is not 
necessary to allege that the landlord 
knew the paint was lead based; here, 
mere evidence that the landlord had 
knowledge of deteriorating paint 
created an issue of material fact. 
The Browns, and their twins 
born in January of 1984, lived in a 
home rented from the Dermers. One 
month prior to becoming pregnant 
with the twins, Ms. Brown allegedly 
gave notice to the landlords that there 
was chipping paint in the home. The 
landlord denied receiving this 
notification, and the condition went 
uncorrected. In 1985, both children 
were diagnosed with increased levels 
oflead in their bloodstream. Upon 
investigation of the residence, the 
Baltimore City Health Department 
found thirty violations related to lead 
paint, which the landlords were given 
one week to correct; however, they 
failed to comply for almost three 
months. The Browns subsequently 
filed suit for negligence. 
The Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City granted the Dermer's motion for 
summary judgment, which was 
affirmed by the court of special 
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appeals. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari. The issue 
before the court of appeals was what 
must a plaintiff allege in a lead paint 
case to survive summary judgment. 
Specifically, whether evidence must be 
offered that the landlord knew or had 
reason to know a danger existed due 
to lead-based, chipping paint, or 
whether mere allegations of 
knowledge of chipping paint were 
sufficient. 
The court of appeals noted that 
pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-501(e), 
the plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts 
from which a jury could conclude that 
the defendants acted negligently. 
Brown, 357 Md. at 354, 744 A.2d 
at 53. The couit stated that "summary 
judgment is generally not appropriate 
for issues concerning knowledge, 
motive, or intent because the facts 
concerning the defendant's 
knowledge and conduct, and the 
circumstances in which they existed. 
.. are best left for resolution by the 
trier of fact attrial." ld. at355, 744 
A.2d at 53 (quoting Federal Sav. & 
Loan Ins. Corp. v. Williams, 599 
F.Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1984)). 
The court turned its analysis to 
Maryland law regarding negligence, 
noting that a plaintiff must prove (1) a 
duty upon the defendant to protect the 
plaintiff from injury, (2) breach of that 
duty, (3) resulting injury, and (4) 
proximate cause between the injury 
and defendant's breach. Id. at 356, 
744 A.2d at 54. The court 
recognized that the requisite duty may 
be established by statute; thus, the 
violation of a statute may provide 
evidence of a breach of duty. ld. at 
358, 744A.2dat55. Finally, a prima 
facie case of negligence is made by 
showing a nexus between violation of 
the statute and the resulting injury. ld. 
at 359, 744 A.2d at 55. 
The court of appeals examined 
the Baltimore City Housing Code, 
which provides that in order to 
properly maintain property, "interior 
walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors and 
windows shall be kept clean and free 
from any flaking, loose or peeling 
paint and paper." ld. .(quoting 
Baltimore City Code (1983 Repl. 
Vol.),Art.13 § 703(2)(c)). Thecourt 
found a statutory obligation existed 
to eradicate deteriorating paint 
conditions about which the landlord 
knows, regardless of lead content. 
See id. at 359-60, 744 A.2d at 55-
56. Otherwise stated, a violation is 
established merely by showing "that 
there was flaking, loose or peeling 
paint .... " ld. The court held that 
this statutory violation constituted 
evidence of negligence by the 
landlord. ld. at 359, 744 A.2d at 
55. 
The court, however, was quick 
to point out that the plaintiff must still 
establish that the landlord was 
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provided notice of the violation. Id 
at 361, 744 A.2d at 57. The court 
stated this "reason to know" test was 
the fIrst prong that the plaintiff must 
satisfY to survive summary judgment. 
Id at 362, 744 A.2d at 57. The court 
noted that it must be shown that "the 
defendant has knowledge sufficient to 
support an inference of knowledge of 
the condition is required." Id It is 
unnecessary that the plaintiff show that 
the deteriorating paint contained lead. 
Id The second prong of the test is 
foreseeability. Id The plaintiff must 
show that a reasonable person would 
realize that an injury due to lead paint 
is possible. Id The Defendant's 
actual knowledge is not an issue. Id 
The court then compared this 
standard with its prior jurisprudence 
in the area oflead paint litigation. The 
court analyzed its holding in Richwind 
Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 
661,645 A.2d 1147 (1994), where 
evidence was presented that the 
apartment in question, built prior to 
1957, was in a state of ill repair, 
including chipping and flaking paint. 
Id. at 363, 744 A.2d at 57. In 
Richwind, it was further established 
that the landlord had been a property 
owner in Baltimore for sixteen years 
and knew that property constructed 
before 1957 often contained lead 
paint. Id 
The Richwind court found that 
sufficient evidence existed to defeat 
the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. Id at 364, 744 A.2d at 
58. The court in the instant case, 
however, suggested that the showing 
in Richwind actually exceeded the 
proof necessary to survive summary 
judgment. Id. at 365, 744 A.2d at 
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59. The court noted that the jury could 
have "found that the defendant's 
breach of statutory duty prescribed 
by the housing code was proximately 
related to the injury alleged, without 
specifically finding that the defendant 
had actual knowledge or reason to 
know of the presence or hazards of 
lead-based paint." Id 
The court then analyzed the 
cases that the landlords offered to 
support their contention that summary 
judgment was appropriate. The 
decisions in both Winston Properties 
v. Sanders, 565 N.E.2d 1280, (Ohio 
App. 1989) and Garcia v. Jiminez, 
539 N.E.2d 1356, (Ill. App. 1989) 
held that mere notice of deteriorating 
paint "was insuffIcient to establish 
liability." Id However, the court 
distinguished both cases from the case 
at bar. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland noted that in Winston, no 
statute existed prohibiting peeling 
paint without reference to lead 
content, and in Garcia, there was no 
applicable statute at all, and the court 
relied entirely on common law 
principles. Id at 370, 744 A.2d at 
61. Thus, neither case instructed 
against holding the landlords liable. 
In the instant case, the court of 
appeals found that the reason to know 
element was satisfied because the 
plaintiff testified she gave notice to the 
Dermers regarding the eroding paint. 
Id at 367, 744 A.2d at 60. Thus, 
accepting plaintiffs testimony to be 
true, the first-prong was met. Id 
Additionally, the foreseeability 
element was likewise met. Id The 
court noted that the Housing Code 
serves to put landlords on notice that 
lead paint poses a significant danger 
to children. Id The court stated that 
even assuming arguendo, that the code 
was insufficient, during depositions, 
defendants acknowledged awareness 
of lead paint laws and regulations 
prohibiting loose paint. Id at 368, 
744 at 60. The court therefore found 
that it is clear that the lead paint injuries 
suffered by the plaintiffs were 
foreseeable, and the second-prong is 
thus satisfied. Id 
The court of appeals's holding 
in Brown represents a significant 
change in Maryland law regarding 
summary judgment in lead paint cases. 
Although the court suggested that 
"Richwind does not establish a factual 
threshold for all lead poisoning cases," 
that is precisely how it was viewed 
by the legal community, including the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
in this case. Id at 365, 744 A.2d at 
59. There was no suggestion in 
Richwind or any subsequent case that 
Richwind"satisfied a higher burden" 
than was required. Id Thus, this ruling 
greatly lowers the bar that the plaintiff 
must clear to defeat a defendant's 
motion for swnmary judgment. The 
court's holding practically guarantees 
that summary judgment will almost 
never succeed, and plaintiffs will 
almost always be granted the 
opportunity to present their case to a 
Jury. 
This ruling represents a 
reasonable bright-line test-o if notice 
is given of defective paint, it must be 
corrected. The burden is placed on 
the landlord to investigate claims of 
deteriorating paint made by tenants. 
As a result of this ruling, to minimize 
liability landlords will likely be more 
responsive to tenants' complaints 
regarding paint. If they fail to respond 
to allegations of deteriorating paint, it 
is at their own peril. 
In sum, requiring knowledge 
merely of defects in paint rather than 
knowledge of the presence of lead 
paint is a common sense approach 
dictated by the language of the statute. 
Moreover, it strikes an appropriate 
balance between the needs of tenants 
and landlords. 
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